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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a
common law trust, and JOHN PAUL
JONES, S. LEWIS CRANDALL,
JOHN RUSSELL RITTER, et. al.,

Petition

for

Rehearing

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
a corporation,

Case No.
12887

Defendant-Appellant.

COMES NOW the Appellant above-named and
presents this Petition for a Rehearing in the aboveentitled case. The issues on appeal were decided and
filed with the Clerk of the Court on July 16, 1973.
Appellant predicates this petition on the grounds
that the Court erred as a matter of law in affirming
the rulings and judgment of the trial Court for the
specific reasons stated below :
I

The Court erred in sustaining the money judgment computed by using an assumed rate of Sigurd
plant production and an assumed rate of profit
after the Court had set aside Finding No. 27 determining Appellant had no obligation to operate the
Sigurd plant at a given level.
1

II
The Court erred in sustaining damages alleged
to be caused by (a) Appellant's sale of gypsum products from the Lovell, Wyoming and Acme, Texas
plants and by (b) Appellant's change of method of
accounting.

III
The Court erred in failing to apply basic and
fundamental principles of contract law in interpreting the lease agreement between the parties.
IV
The Court erred in affirming a judgment of the
Trial Judge based only on incompetent opinion evidence.

v
The Court erred in holding that Respondents
accountant was competent and qualified as an expert
in the areas of marketing and economics in the gypsum industry and using his evidence to support the
judgment.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing grounds it
is respectfully urged that this Petition for Rehearing
be granted, that the prior opinion be withdrawn,
that, if considered appropriate, further arguments
be permitted, that the judgment of the District Court
2

be reversed and that the record be returned to the
District Court with direction to dismiss the Complaint, or in the alternative direct the District Court
to grant a New Trial.

GEORGE W. LATIMER

KEITH E. TAYLOR

ROY B. MOORE
0f and for

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a
common law trust, and JOHN PAUL
JONES, S. LEWIS CRANDALL,
JOHN RUSSELL RITTER, DONALD
W. McEWEN and BARRY PHILLIPS,
Plaintiffs-R cspondrnts,
vs.
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Def endant-Appcllant.

Case No.

12887

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

The opinion in this case seems to skip over the
law, precedent and facts and to be decided on expedi- :
ency. Maybe it is not a requirement that a Court of
Last Resort mention facts to support its conclusions
or pay heed to authorities from other jurisdictions,
but they do furnish guide lines which should be of
help to the Court and future litigants. But more
importantly, some attention should be given to principles and concepts advanced in prior decision by
this Court. Significantly, in this instance, there is
not an authority mentioned in the opinion, although
fourteen (14) were cited by Appellant which counsel
believe shed light on the issues and eighteen ( 18)
mentioned by Respondent as being worthy of consideration.
4

The case was tried, briefed and argued at the
Trial Court level, and it was extensively briefed and
argued in the hearing before this Court. Apparently,
clarity on the part of counsel for Appellant must
have been absent for the opinion rendered by three
(3) Justices of this Court, is so clearly without any
legal foundation and is so inconsistent and illogical
within its own four corners, that counsel for Appellant believes they have a duty to point out emphatically why they believe a majority of Court
should reconsider their holding. In that connection,
we cast aside some of the lesser important errors
and raise only the most egregious.
ARGUMENTS
I
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
MONEY JUDGMENT COMPUTED BY USING AN
ASSUMED RA TE OF SIGURD PLANT PRODUCTION
AND AN ASSUMED RA TE OF PROFIT AFTER THE
COURT HAD SET ASIDE FINDING NO. 27 DETERMINING APPELLANT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO
OPERATE THE SIGURD PLANT AT A GIVEN LEVEL.

On page 3, the majority opinion concedes that
"we can find nothing in the 'requirements' clause to
justify its interpretation in support of such conclusion as to (a) above". The finding there referred
to and categorically rejected by the majority was to
the effect that in the future Appellant "is 'obligated
to operate its Sigurd plant (annually) at no less
than' 128,539,000 square feet."
5

Finding No. 27 with its concomitant burden,
was wholly premised upon two of the imaginary
assumptions of Mr. Caldwell, set forth in Exhibits
139-141, without which the damage computations
set forth therein cannot stand. These assumptions
are set forth at page 57 of Appellant's opening brief
and again at page 13 of its reply brief, and are as
follows:
During the years 1967-1968 the Sigurd plant
could have produced at 97% of the capacity
which was the capacity achieved by that plant
in 1967 and at the same profit level as ica.s
reached in the years 1962, 1963 and 1964"
(Exs. 139-141) (Emphasis added).
Surely on this record the Court which in its
opinion relies on the same two assumptions for damages must find that these will not stand the test of
critical examination.
The entire damage computations, made by the
Trial Court, in its modified acceptance of Exhibits
139-141 and affirmed by the majority of this Court,
are premised upon both an obligation and the ability
to produce at not less than 128,539,000 square feet
per year as set forth in Finding of Fact 27. The
majority, having found that there is no requirement
for Appellant to produce and sell that amount of
wallboard per year, has determined that what the
Sigurd plant's producing capacity may have been
in 1965, 1966 or 1967 is immaterial to damages or
future royalty calculations. By using the production
figure of 128,539,000 square feet in the calculation
for damages, the Trial Court had to assume that the
6

production into the historic Sigurd market area,
over and above that which was actually shipped from
Sigurd, could have been sold at a profit. The only
testimony as to that issue was to the contrary. The
experts qualified to testify as to this subject stated
as follows:
1. Mr. Birch (Ab. 577)
Q. And, sir, could the sales that were
then being made at Acme have been
made at Sigurd at a profit?
A. No, sir.
2. Mr. McCaskill (Ab. 549-550):
Q. Now, sir, Mr. Caldwell made another assumption which was that if
the Lovell production in 1967, '68,
'69 and '70, the years it was operating and if the Acme product that
went into the California market, after the expansion had been diverted
to and sold from Sigurd that it could
have been and would have been sold
for a profit at Sigurd in the years
1968, '69 and '70. Is that a proper
assumption in your opinion?
A. No, sir, it isn't.
3. Mr. Wilson (Ab. 526)
Q. Now, Mr. McCarthy also asked you,
sir, about the supplying of certain
Acme movements into southern California through Apex under a JohnsManville contract. My question, sir,
if at the time of those transactions,
the shipments had been made for
Sigurd?
7

A. Yes.
Q. Could they have been made at a profit to the Sigurd plant?
A. No, they could not. In 1968 this shipment would have been made from
Sigurd at a $3.00 per thousand loss
on a half inch board to the Sigurd
plant by 1970 this loss would have
increased to $8.00.
This leaves that part of the damage calculation unsupported by any foundation. Thus, the Court having
properly stricken Finding No. 27, ExhibitR 139-141
are inaccurate and unusable as they have been deprived of the major underlying factor for the damage
computations and the method of calculating future
profit royalties. Since this Court found that there is
no requirement of a fixed production in the agreement, it is the height of inconsistency to fix damages
and future computation of royalties on a fixed requirement which is not stated in the agreement and
has been found to be unsupportable by the Court.
The majority opinion, by eliminating the Trial
Court's Finding No. 27 and yet approving the formula in Exhibits 139-141 for calculating future royalties has thrown the issues at Triail into confusion
and the findings into inconsistency. The majority
was correct in setting aside Finding No. 27, but in
failing to change the other findings which were interwoven with No. 27, it observed the molehill but
missed the mountain of errors committed by the
Trial Judge. The court should take another look at
the mountain.
8

II
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING DAMAGES
ALLEGED TO BE CAUSED BY (A) APPELLANT'S SALE
OF GYPSUM PRODUCTS FROM THE LOVELL, WYOMING AND ACME, TEXAS PLANTS AND BY (B)
APPELLANT'S CHANGE OF METHOD OF ACCOUNTING.

Another major error was for the court to accept
the following syllogism and end up with the wrong
deduction. The argument set forth by the Court proceeds as follows : (a) the lease, prior to the years
complained of by Plaintiffs, provided the lessors with
$90,000 in rental payments per year, but during the
years involved in this litigation only $14,000 per
year was returned to them; (b) the lessees changed
their accounting procedure during the years the payment declined, and they shipped product from their
Acme, Texas and Lovell, Wyoming plants to the
West Coast area. From the two premises set out in
(b) above, a majority of the Court deduced that the
cause of the decline in royalty payments was attributable solely to these actions of lessee.
In the argument under Point III of Appellant's
original brief, it was demonstrated that assuming
arguendo the correctness of all the assumptions Mr.
Caldwell used in Exhibits 139-141 for determining
damages and his method of calculating the profit
royalty except for that part of (b) which characterized the infusion of Lovell and Acme production as
the sole cause of the precipitous price decline of
gypsum products in the "historic Sigurd market
9

area", the damages awarded were excessive. Calculated properly the amount of damages awarded
would be reduced by $233,416.00 and that reduction
would have a proportionate effect on the formula
used for future royalty calculations. vVe ask the majority to review the damage computation, but in
addition we offer the arguments which follow as pursuasive reasons for reversing the present decision.
We vigorously controvert the conclusion that
the infusion of the Lovell and Acme production in
the western market area was the cause of the precipitous price decline, and thus the cause of the
decrease of profits to the Respondents to the extent
attributable to the difference in the price obtained
in 1968-70 as opposed to prior years. To support
that assumption, the Court must conjure up the
following suppositions and then ignore the facts set
forth in the record which refute them. The facts
are gleaned from the record of the trial in this case
and they are consistent with those stated in the opinion of Wall Products Co. vs. National Gypsum Co.,
et al, 326 F.Supp 295 (N.D. Calif. 1971). That case
deals with the same product and industry, in the
same geographic area, and in the same time frame
as the case before this Court.
To support its deduction, a majority of the
Court must find that the Lovell and Acme production was the only or predominent infusion of addi10

'

tional products into the "historic market area". Significantly, in that regard, the facts disclose that between 1966-68 U.S. Gypsum, National Gypsum and
Kaiser Gypsum added 1,287 million square feet of
capacity to their plants - 85% of the total increase
of all plants in the industry during those years; that
Appellant had a relatively small share of the West
Coast market, possibly 10%; that in 1968 U.S. Gypsum, National, Kaiser and Flintkote accounted for
75 % of production in the northern California area.
From the foregoing figures it should be obvious
that the above assumption used by the Court in rendering its decision is without foundation. Thus, wiping out the proposition that the precipitous price
decline in the western market was attributable to
Lovell and Acme, the only other assumption left in
the hypothesis above is that the profit decrease after
1962-64 was attributable to Georgia Pacific's change
of accounting methods. If this were true, it would
follow that the other manufacturers of gypsum wallboard in the same market area would suffer no comparable loss. This is rational because gypsum, being
a homogenous product, would command the same
price from all manufacturers and cost of manufacture would also remain fairly constant. Thus, if the
losses at Sigurd were only a matter of accounting
procedure, the remainder of the industry would have
profit levels equal to the years 1962-64, just as the
majority of this Court speculates that Sigurd's profit
would remain relatively unchanged if it were not
11

for improper accounting. The facts related by the
Trial Court in the Wall Products case supra refutes
this erroneous conclusion. The Court there found as
follows:
Company

U.S. Gypsum
Kaiser Gypsum
Flintkote

Comparative Earnings
Early UO's
Net Earnings

Late 60's
Net Earnings

14.4% of assets
(1960)

7.6% of assets (1968)

10.3% of net assets
(1963)

losses as high as
$1.2 million per year
( 1965-68)

$2.4 million
(1962)

of $1.0 million per year
(1965-66), protits of $150,000
per year ( 1967 and 1968)

Keep in mind that these losses were before the
precipitous price deterioration which began in 1968.
Thus, if the Court were to continue to assume the
correctness of Caldwell's assumption that the profits
of Georgia Pacific during the years in question should
have been equal to the 1962-64 profits, the whole
industry, other than Georgia Pacific, missed a golden
opportunity to thrive during the lean years.
From the facts and circumstances above-related,
it appears to be inconceivable to believe that Appellant's operation at its Lovell and Acme plants could
have been the cause of the price decline in the western market area. Particularly is that true when
consideration is given to the fact that it supplied
less than ten per cent ( 10 <,lo ) of that market, and the
three (3) other major producers in the area con12

tributed 85 % of the increased production during the
period in question. It is even more inconceivable to
think that the Court would accept the hypothesis
that the decline in profits at the Sigurd plant was
caused by accounting changes and Lovell and Acme
production when the whole industry was suffering
not only major profit decreases, but losses at the
same time. As we construe the majority of the Court
in their holding, the three ( 3) Justices arrive at the
remarkable conclusion that Sigurd during an era of
depression should have made profits equal to those
made in the industry's peak years.
For the foregoing reasons we solicit the Court
to consider the true business situation, not one hypothesized by an accountant, concerning the economics
and marketing conditions involved in this case, and
to determine how necessary they are to use as a
yardstick for a determination of damages and how
unfair it is to use a measuring rod created on unfounded assumptions by Caldwell. If, as the Court
seems to hold, a proper determination of correct
accounting methods is essential for future computation on damages, it should not require Appellant to
use the 1962-64 profit levels as the measuring rod
for later years when actually, and under any accounting method, profits, if any, would be much less.
If the majority of the Court intended to hold Appellant to a horizontal profit level through good years
and lean years, we can only hope they will realize
the error in their holding and reverse their decision.

13

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
BASIC AND FUND AMENT AL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW IN INTERPRETING THE LEASE AGREE- '
MENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Without reference to supporting authority on
principles of contract law, the majority opinion of
the Court has imposed obligations upon GeorgiaPacific which were never the subject of the lease
agreement between the parties or their predecessors
in interest. Nowhere in the lease is there a requirement that ore from the leased premises serve a specific geographic market area. It is Hornbook Law
that in a requirement contract as is before the Court,
such an implied covenant cannot be imposed on the
leasee.
Only the least thought is necessary to realize
a 'gap' in an agreement should not be filled
merely because the gap exists. No promise, or
condition of a promise, should be added by
either implication or judicial construction
merely because the parties did not put it in
their words of agreement. 3 Corbin on Cor1r
tracts §569 at 341 (1960 ed.) (Emphasis added)
This point of law is especially applicable where
( 1) a minimum royalty has been fixed in the lease,
(HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77
at 81 (3rd Cir. 1966), (2) where the subject matter
has been dealt with elsewhere in the lease by obligating lessees to construct a plant on the leased
premises, Hawkins v. United States, 96 U.S. 689,
14

24 L.Ed 607 at 610 (1877), and (3) where the
lease was drawn by the able attorney for the LessorPlaintiff, Judge Ritter, Guiand v. Walton, 22 Utah
2d 1961 at 198, 450 P.2d 467 ( 1969), Continental
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d
733 (1957); Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323 at
326, 400 P.2d 503 ( 1965) and Restatement of Contracts Vol 1, Sec. 236 (1932). Respondents did not
offer one citation of authority refuting these determinative principles, nor did the majority opinion
care to distinguish them from the facts of the case
at hand, rather, both the Court and Respondents
ignored them, as they must to reach the conclusions
they did.
Such basic contract principles cannot be ignored
in determining a case such as this which must be
resolved by the judicial interpretation of a written
agreement.

IV
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING A JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE BASED ONLY ON INCOMPETENT OPINION EVIDENCE.

A majority of the Court glosses over the fact
that the only witness brought forth by Respondents
to testify as to the necessary economic and marketing
assmnptions to determine damages in this action as
well as the formula for future profit royalties, admittedly had no qualifications in the areas of marketing and economics. In touching on the lack of
15

qualifications of Respondents' expert in the fields
of marketing and economics, the majority opinion
said:
The conclusion of this court is that, considering the record as a whole, the1·e may have been
a lack of expertise as to marketing but considerable knmvledge with respect to sound accounting principles, that if believed by the
trial court, survived the test of the parties'
agreement, acquiescence, a quarter century of
time, and the erudition of accountants employed by four predecessor lessees, and one
accountable to defendant to its perhaps economic displeasure.
What has escaped the majority of the Court is
the fact that, even ascribing the greatest of erudition
in the field of accounting to the Respondents' accounting witness, Exhibits 139-141, relied upon by
the Trial Court and the majority of this Court for
both the determination of damages and the method
of calculation of future royalties, required economic
and marketing assumptions. Those made by Caldwell were totally in contradiction to basic and fundamental economic and marketing realities as shown
by the evidence. Point II was devoted to an illustration to the Court of two of the assumptions that are
of absolute necessity to the measure of damages and
future profit royalties (if, as the Court held, Exhibits 139-141 are to be used for that purpose), and
yet were clearly and irrefutably erroneous and inconsistent with all manner of logic, let alone economic
and marketing expertise.

16

1

We just do not believe the Court can conclude
rationally that: (a) the profits in any given year or
any given group of years (in this case 1968 through
1970) should be comparable to prior years (in this
case 1962 through 1964) solely on the basis of accounting expertise, when such determinations should
be made on actual marketing conditions, and not on
the basis of accounting conjecture, and (b) that the
infusion of the Lovell and Acme production into the
western market area was the sole cause of a markedly greater price deterioration in that area than
any other area of the United States. In that connection it must be considered that price is a direct result
of supply and demand, subjects which are totally
without the realm of the accountant and exclusively
within the range of knowledge of economics and
marketing specialists.
Just how one accountant with unknown and
in fact admitted lack of qualification and expertise
in marketing and economics analysis, can be raised
to the level of an expert in those fields by judicial
fiat remains unique to the law and a mystery to
counsel of Appellant. However, were Appellant willing to admit that the accounting procedure which
it changed so as to determine net profit at the distribution level rather than the ultimate consumer level
was improper, we call the Court's attention to the
fact that this was the only accounting procedure
which the Trial Court found erroneous. Limited by
that holding, a judgment in the sum awarded by
the Trial Judge cannot be sustained by this Court
17

nor could it require future royalty payments to be
based upon calculations which assume profits in
years where there are none.
One other point bears mentioning. Not only may
there have been a "lack of expertise in the field of
marketing and economics" on the part of the expert
for Respondent, there was an absence of proof from
Caldwell himself that he was knowledgeable in the
area involved. The majority of the Court, to escape
that situation, sought to build in the necessary expertise by reference to the erudition of accountants
employed by predecessor lessess for accounting purposes, without any showing of their respective qualifications in the area of marketing. It is fair to say
that the Court indulged in "boot strapping" in a
most expansive way in its acceptance of accounting
testimony on economics and marketing principles
from Caldwell.
If cases in the evidentiary field teach the prac-

tioner anything worthwhile, it is that before an expert can be permitted to testify, his qualifications
must be shown relative to the particular subject matter in which his knowledge is offered in evidence.
In order to qualify the witness in this case, it was
incumbent upon Respondents to show Caldwell had
acquired special knowledge of the subject matter
about which he is to testify (marketing conditions
and economics concerning gypsum products in the
western United States and particularly the West
Coast), either by study of recognized authorities or
18

by practical experience so that he could give the
Court assistance and guidance in solving a problem
which the Court was otherwise not able to solve.
In the case of Caldwell, his training in accounting would not give him special knowledge about the
marketing and economics on the West Coast. All he
ever contended was that he inspected the books of
the Respondent and from that formed his opinions.
When asked if he had made any marketing studies
of gypsum products to determine whether his assumptions were factual under the market place over
the periods 1962-63-64 and 1967-68-69 and '70, he
answered in the negative. He had not consulted or
studied any recognized authority and had no practical experience. He had audited certain books and
records of Appellant but those would hardly furnish
a base to qualify him as an expert in economic and
marketing conditions in the gypsum industry.

Significantly, the Respondents' brief on appeal
is entirely silent on this specific point and perhaps
the reason for that omission is that it was too difficult to answer. However, the Court appears to adopt
a unique theory of substitution, that is, qualifications
of an accountant may serve to clothe him with the
expertise of an economist and marketing specialist.
The evidence on the qualifications of Mr. Caldwell was furnished only by him, and aside from the
answers next stated below is quoted in part in the
brief filed on Appeal. At the sake of being charged
19

with a repetitious presentation, we state the witnesses direct testimony and that furnished on crossexamination.
After stating him name, Mr. Caldwell was
asked the following questions and gave the following
answers:

Q. What is your profession, please?
A. I am a Certified Public Accountant.
Q. Will you please tell the Court when you
became certified and what your professional activities have been since the time
you became certified?
A. I became certified in 1952. I began my
public accounting career in 1950. (Ab. 275)
The witness then went on to state that he was a
member of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and also a member of the Utah Society of C.P.A.'s; that he had engaged in services
relating to mergers and acquisitions, analyzing financial situations of businesses to help management;
that his services had been used in tire manufacturing, meat packing, motion picture exhibitors, and
petroleum industry. There is not a fact shown which
would even suggest any qualification in the particular fields which are involved in the case of bar.
It does not appear in any of his direct examination that the services were different from those performed by any C.P.A. and certainly these would not
encompass familiarity with marketing and economic

20

conditions in the gypsum industry in the West Coast
area. This is made certain by his cross-examination
which is now quoted:

Q.

But you don't know that and you haven't
made that study as an economist or as a
market analyst?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you are not an economist and you
are not a market analyst?
A. No, sir, I am not a market analyst.
Q. And you are not an economist?
A. I am not a professional economist.
Q. And you haven't made any particular
studies of the economy of the gypsum
industry as it relates to these projections
other than the books and records (of
Georgia-Pacific) which you have described herein?
A. That is correct, yes, sir.
Q. So for example, you can't tell us at any
given point of time what the competitors
of Georgia-Pacific were doing in the market place?
A. No, sir.
Q. And you can't tell us of any particular
time what the customers of GeorgiaPacific were doing or demanding in the
market place?
A. Only as it relates to the price which was
being charged to customers. (Ab. 36465).
From the foregoing facts, it is apparent that the
majority of the court should rule with appellant on
this point.

21

v
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS' ACCOUNTANT WAS COMPETENT
AND QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT IN THE AREAS OF
MARKETING AND ECONOMICS IN THE GYPSUM
INDUSTRY AND USING HIS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE JUDGMENT.

It is the contention of Appellant that, even assuming for the sake of argument some slight degree
of expertise on the part of Mr. Caldwell in the marketing field, the facts upon which he based his opinions or conclusions were figments of his imagination
and mere guesswork or conjecture. We have already
set out our views on his lack of qualifications, coupled
with his errors in his fanciful computations, and
these will not be repeated in this argument. We will
only seek to show the Court what other Courts of
Last Resort have stated about opinions of experts
in one field based on an insufficient showing of qualifications to support their conclusions in another
field.

We believe the authorities hereinafter cited sustain our position than an opinion of an expert must
be based upon facts proved, or assumed from evidence to be proven in this particular field for the
purpose of answering a hypothetical question. If a
fact is unproven or false, or in an area unfamiliar to
the expert, the opinion is unsound. Moreover, the
opinion of the expert cannot be used as the source
to supply the facts necessary to support his conclusion. Accordingly, an expert's opinion is inadmis-

22

sable and in effect worthless for evidentiary purposes
if it is founded on nebulous facts, false impressions,
or speculation or conjecture. This usually happens
when an expert in one field is used to supply evidence in a different area and this is the situation in
the case at bar.
In Craig v. Champlin Petroleum Company, 435
F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1971), the Court stated:
The only evidence found in the record to support the trial judge's finding that there was a
market available at the Ringwood plant contract price was the testimony of Walter P.
Sandlin, a consulting petroleum engineer, with
primary experience in gas processing. Mr.
Sandlin testified that in his opinion there was
a market available as of June 1, 1965. During
this period of time, Mr. Sandlin was working
as an advisor for the Cooperative Refinery
Association of Kansas City. He prepared a
study for them and recommended that they
approach Champlin with regard to purchasing the Chaney Dell gas. However, the management of the Cooperative Refinery Association decided not to try and purchase the gas
and there was no established price recommended at which they might attempt to buy
the gas. Nevertheless, Sandlin testified that
he felt the market price in the area was established by the Ringwood plant contract. Mr.
Sandlin testified that he would have been interested in building a plant and purchasing
the gas in 1965, but it is clear that nothing
was done to achieve this end. No person could
be specifically identified as being available to
purchase the casinghead gas produced in the
Chaney Dell area. Sandlin' s opinion is appar23

ently based on speculation and conjecture and
is therefore of diniinished value in sustaining
the finding that a market existed.
In Kale v. Douthitt, 27 4 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1960), the Court of Appeals had this to say:

Generally a hypothetical question must assume
all facts disclosed by the evidence material to
the theory of the case as viewed from the side
propounding the question. A question which
assumes any material fact not supported by
the evidence is inadmissible. A question which
omits any material fact essential to the formation of a rational opinion is likewise incompetent. The facts upon which the expert
bases his opinion or conclusion must permit
reasonably accurate conclusions as distirir
guished from, mere guess or conjecture. 20
Am. Jr., Evidence, §§788, et seq.
A similar concept is announced in U.S. American Tobacco Co. et al, 39 F.Supp 957 (D.C.E.D. Ky.
1941):
. No question is raised as to the qualifications
of Mr. Mohat as an expert statistician, nor
as to the competence of his testimony as an
expert if limited to a mere statistical compilation of the data in evidence or his computations or statistical analyses thereof. Since the
witness professes no qualifications as an expert in the grading of tobacco, conclusions
reached by him in respect to kinds of tobacco
in terms of Government grades or in respect
to recognizable differences bet?i.Yeen grades or
in respect to the significance of differences between the prices of grades being outside his
field of expert knoil'ledge must be predicated
upon a hypothetical state of facts, and it is to
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the competence of such conclusions that the
defendants direct their objections to his proposed testimony.
Before an expert opinion resting upon a hypothetical basis may be received as evidence, the
facts constituting the basis of the opinion must
be disclosed and thefr existence supported by
evidence. In Atlantic Life Insurance Company
v. Vaughan, 6 Cir., 71F.2d394, 395, the court
thus expressed the familiar rule: "While the
courts 1cill give icide latitude to the reception
of expert opinion evidence, we think it axiomatic that it must be based upon conceded
or proved facts, and that a naked opinion,
based obviously on mere speculation and conjecture, does not rise to the dignity of evidence, * * *"
And lastly in Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Vaughan,
71 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1934), the Court of Appeals
postulated as follows:
On cross-examination, however, Dr. Sanders
testified that it is impossible to look at the outside of a man's leg and tell whether it is in a
thrombosed condition if the smaller veins are
involved; that he could not say whether the
thrombus inside the bone was dissolved or
whether it continued after the insured fell
into the ditch, and that nobody could tell. He
testified that it was entirely possible for an
embolus from the th1·ombus which followed
the fracture to have traversed the blood
stream into the pulmonary artery, and that it
was entirely possible for the death to have had
that particular origin. When pressed for the
basis of his original opinion, he explained that
he first assumed there was a blow on the left
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leg somewhere, though he didn't look for it.
He next assumed that an embolus had broken
from a thrombus in the left leg. From this
assumption he had to conclude that the thrombus was caused by some disease or blow. Assuming the insured had no diseased condition
a further conclusion was that there was a trau'.
matic injury to the blood vessel as a result of
the second accident, though he found no evidence of that fact.
We conclude from th'is that Dr. Sanders' evidence on cross-exmnination was completely
destructive of his original opinion, and, there
being no other proof, there was no substantial
evidence to submit to the injury on the theory
that the second accident was the sole cause of
death. While the courts will give wide latitude
to the reception of expert opinion evidence,
we think it axiomatic that it must be based
upon conceded or proved facts, and that a
naked opinion, based obviously on mere speculation and conjecture, does not rise to the
dignity of evidence, especially when it is in
conflict with the conceded physical facts disclosed by the autopsy.
We believe that in this case, the majority traveled off the road to justice by assuming qualifications
of Respondents' accountant and then accepting his
testimony to support their opinion. Respondents' entire case hinges on his testimony and on the accuracy
or inaccuracies of his assumed hypotheses and projections. In that connection, it is worthy of note that
not a single witness schooled or trained in the economics or marketing of gypsum products in the western United States was produced by the Respondents.
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Counsel for Appellant believe that the reason for
this is that the Respondents were unable to present
to the Court any who would agree with Caldwell's
premises. Not only did the experts presented by Appellant disagree with them, but they offered persuasive facts to support their opinions.
Counsel for Appellant believe the opinions expressed by their experts are supported by the facts
of record and should compel a reversal of the decision
of the majority of the Court.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, we respectfully
request the court grant the petition for rehearing,
reverse the present decision and grant the relief
prayed for in Appellant's original appeal.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE W. LATIMER
KEITH E. TAYLOR
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of and for

PARSONS, BERLE & LATIMER
79 South State Street
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